Somewhere, on a disk you will never see, there may be a copy of what your API said this morning.
It is encrypted, so whoever holds it can't read it. They don't need to yet. Storage is cheap, and they are betting that a machine able to undo the encryption arrives while your data still matters.
The industry calls this harvest now, decrypt later. It is why quantum computing belongs in your planning now.
The number keeps shrinking
In 2019, the best public estimate said that breaking a 2048-bit RSA key would take a quantum computer with around 20 million qubits.[1] It sounded like science fiction, and most of us filed it there.
In 2025, one of the same researchers at Google redid the math and came back with fewer than one million.[2] Nobody had to build anything to get there. It was better algorithms, worked out on paper.
In February 2026, the startup Iceberg Quantum published a design that needs fewer than 100,000.[3] In October, Alice & Bob put its own figure at 22,593.[4]
These are designs for machines nobody has built yet, and each rests on its own assumptions. But the estimates keep falling while the machines keep growing, and nobody can tell you the year they meet.
Y2K at least printed its date on the calendar. The first people to own a machine that breaks RSA will have every reason to keep quiet about it.
The people who set the rules have stopped waiting
Ask ten experts when that day comes and you will get ten answers. The people who write the standards stopped arguing about the date and picked their own.
NIST published the replacement algorithms in 2024. In October 2026 it finalized the transition plan: today's public-key cryptography is deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.[5] That covers RSA and elliptic curves, which is nearly every key, certificate and signed token your systems rely on.
The browsers did not wait. Chrome and Firefox already negotiate a post-quantum key exchange with any server that offers one.
If 2030 sounds far away, remember SHA-1. Researchers showed it was weak in 2005,[6] and browsers stopped accepting it in 2017. That was twelve years to retire a single hash function. This time it is every public key you own.
The question nobody can answer
Every migration like this starts with the same question: where, exactly, do we use cryptography?
Some of the answer is in code written by people who left years ago. Some is buried in config files and in libraries you never chose on purpose. And some is in no repository at all, because it is whatever your load balancer agrees to when a client says hello.
Most teams answer it with a spreadsheet and a round of interviews. Six months later the spreadsheet is wrong.
So we built the inventory
NightVision's quantum readiness answers that question from both places.
It starts in your source. You already run nightvision openapi extract to map your API. That same run now reads the cryptography your code chooses, across seven languages, down to the line where the RSA key is generated or the token is signed. It runs on your machine, and your code never leaves it.
It finishes on the wire. Every NightVision scan greets your hosts the way a current browser does and records whether they can negotiate a post-quantum key exchange. It notes which algorithms sign the tokens in your traffic and what your identity provider publishes. It only connects and reads, and it works on the services behind your firewall.
Everything lands on one screen, sorted by what to do about it: Fix now, Migrate by 2030, Plan by 2035, or Ready. When a customer or an auditor asks for proof, the inventory exports as a Cryptography Bill of Materials.
Start counting
Replacing your cryptography will take years. Finding it takes one command, and you can run it this afternoon:
nightvision openapi extract . --no-target
Someone may already be saving your traffic for later. The least you can do is know what they will find.
References
- Craig Gidney and Martin Ekerå, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, 2019.
- Craig Gidney, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, 2025.
- The Quantum Insider, Q-Day Just Got Closer: Three Papers in Three Months Are Rewriting the Quantum Threat Timeline, March 2026.
- The Quantum Insider, Alice & Bob Estimates 22,593 Qubits to Break RSA-2048, October 2026.
- NIST, IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, October 2026.
- Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin and Hongbo Yu, Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1, CRYPTO 2005.